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A. A. Sommer, Jr.
INTRODUCTION
It may be aptly said that the Securities Act of 19331 is a "seamless
web," in that to explain or discuss any part of it either presumes some
understanding of the entire act, or requires placing the particular section
under discussion in context. Moreover, because the act is characterized,
and deliberately so, by the presence of several broad and uncertain terms
such as "underwriter" and "public offering," any discussion quickly be-
comes involved with concepts such as "purposes," "meanings in context,"
"legislative history, .... evils
sought to be remedied," and
THE AuTHoR (A.B., University of Notre other refuges when a statutory
Dame, LL.B., Harvard) is a practicing attorney
in Cleveland, Ohio. text is less than crystalline.
Rule 133 is no exception;
in fact it may be the very para-
digm. It was promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission
in 1951 to perpetuate a policy adopted in 1934. That policy as first pro-
posed, and Rule 133 as originally adopted, provided in substance that a
proposal for merger or consolidation when submitted to the shareholders
of a corporation did not constitute an offer or sale of securities to those
shareholders within the meaning of "offer to sell, .... sale," and related
terms. Somewhat later, sales of assets in exchange for securities of an-
other corporation, and reclassifications of securities were accorded similar
treatment. Therefore, compliance with the registration and prospectus
requirements of the Securities Act was not required.
Prior to the 1959 amendments,2 Rule 133 was frequently made the
subject of clinical diagnosis, harsh controversy, animated defense, and
piercing criticism. However, since 1959 the controversy has abated and
1. 48 Star. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm [hereinafter referred to as
Securities Act). Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule 133 under the Securities Act of
1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (rev. ed. 1964) will be hereinafter referred to as Rule 133.
2. See pp. 21-22 infra.
3. See Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities of the Section of Corporations, Bank-
ing and Business Law of the American Bar Association [hereinafter cited as Committee Re-
port], Proposed SEC Rule 133 - Comments of Committee on Federal Regulation of Secur-
ities, 14 Bus. LAw. 423 (1959); Cohen, Rule 133 of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
14 RncoRD oF N.Y.C.B.A. 162 (1959); Orrick, Registration Problems Under the Federal
Securities Act - Resales Following Rule 133 and Exchange Transactions, 10 HASINGS LJ.
1 (1958); Purcell, A Consideration of the No-Sale Theory Under the Securities Act of 1933.
24 BROOKLYN L. REV. 254 (1958); Sargent, A Review of the "No-Sale" Theory of Rule 133,
13 Bus. LAw. 78 (1957); Throop, In Defense of Rule 133 - A Case for Administrative
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it is reported that the Rule is working satisfactorily in its present form
with minimal problems for the Commission. The purpose of this article
is to examine Rule 133 as a permanent part - as permanent as such
rules ever become - of the statutory scheme which centers around the
Securities Act of 1933.
RULE 133 IN THE STATUTORY SCHEME
Prohibitions
Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 sets forth the basic prohibi-
tions on the offering and sale of securities in interstate commerce. Thus,
it is unlawful to use the mails or any other instrument of interstate com-
merce to: (1) sell a security unless a registration statement is effective
with respect to it;' (2) carry a security for the purpose of sale or delivery
after sale unless a registration statement is effective with respect to it;'
(3) carry a prospectus pertaining to a security as to which a registration
statement has been filed, unless it conforms to certain requirements;6
(4) carry a security as to which a registration statement has been filed
for sale or delivery after sale, unless accompanied or preceded by a pre-
scribed prospectus;' and (5) offer to sell or buy a security unless a regis-
tration statement has been filed with respect to it.8 It is difficult to un-
derstand these prohibitions without defining such terms as "sale," "offer
to sell," and "sell." As a part of the Securities Act, Congress defined
these terms as follows: "Sale" includes "every contract of sale or dispo-
sition of a security or interest in a security, for value;" 9 "offer to sell,"
"offer for sale," or "offer" includes "every attempt or offer to dispose of
... a security or interest in a security, for value."'1
Exemptions
In addition to the prohibitory sections, the Securities Act also includes
certain exemptions from the registration and prospectus requirements.
Self-Restraint, 13 Bus. LAw. 389 (1958); Throop, Recent Developments With Respect to
Rule 133, 15 Bus. LAw. 119 (1959); Note, The SEC's No-Sale Rule and Exchanges of Se-
curities Pursuant to Voluntary Reorganization, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1237 (1954).
4. Section 5(a) (1), 48 Stat. 77 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1958).
5. Section 5(a) (2), 48 Stat. 77 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1958).
6. Section 5(b) (1), 48 Stat. 77 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1958).
7. Section 5(b) (2), 48 Stat. 77 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1958).
8. Section 5(c), 48 Star. 77 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1958). Prior to 1954
".sale" included offers to sell and the Securities Act contained no provision permitting an offer
prior to effectiveness of the registration statement; hence, offers to sell were prohibited by
the provision forbidding "sales" prior to the effectiveness of the registration statement. The
1954 amendments made lawful certain kinds of offers subsequent to the filing of the registra-
tion statement but prior to its effectiveness.
9. 48 Star. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (b) (3) (1958).
10. Ibid. This is the present text of § 2(3) of the Securities Act. 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1958). Prior to 1954, the definition of "sale" included an offer
to sell. See note 8 supra. See 1 Loss, SEcuRTrIEs REGULATION 186 (2d ed. 1961).
[VoL 16: 11
Sommer, Rule 133
Thus, specific securities, such as government, bank and savings and loan
securities may be offered and sold without compliance with the registra-
tion or prospectus requirements regardless of the nature of the transac-
tion in which such securities are involved." Also, certain kinds of se-
curity transactions are exempt regardless of the nature of the securities
involved. For example, exchanges by an issuer of securities with its own
security holders are exempt if certain conditions are met. 2 It should be
noted, however, that although any security may be the subject of an ex-
empt transaction, that exemption is not perpetual in that it forever frees
the security from compliance with the registration and prospectus require-
ments. Another kind of transaction in the same security, or in other
securities of the same class, may require some type of registration and use
of the required prospectus.
In addition to these express exemptions, the Securities and Exchange
Commission has limited and narrowly circumscribed power to fashion
additional exemptions. The Securities Act provides that the Commission
may
by its rules and regulations and subject to such terms and conditions as
may be prescribed therein, add any class of securities to the securities
exempted as provided in [Section 3] if it finds that the enforcement
of this [act] with respect to such securities is not necessary in the public
interest and the protection of investors by reason of the small amount
involved or the limited character of the public offering; but no issue
of securities shall be exempted under this subsection where the aggregate
amount at which such issue is offered to the public exceeds $300,000.1'
The Commission also has authority "to make, amend, and rescind such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of
[the act] including rules and regulations... defining accounting, techni-
cal, and trade terms used in [the act] .. . ."" It is this statutory scheme
which is the background of the controversy over Rule 133 and its
predecessor Commission postures.
ANCESTRY OF RULE 133
Soon after passage of the Securities Act the question arose as to
whether the registration and prospectus requirements applied to corporate
reorganizations, mergers, consolidations, and exchanges of assets for stock.
To some extent, the act itself dealt with these matters. Section 3 (a) (9)
exempted from the registration and prospectus requirements of the act
"any security exchanged by the issuer with its existing security holders ex-
clusively where no commission or other remuneration is paid or given
11. Section 3(a) (2), 48 Stat. 75 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1958).
12. Section 3(a) (9), 48 Stat. 75 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1958).
13. Section 3(b), 48 Stat. 75 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. S 77c(b) (1958).
14. Section 19(a), 48 Stat. 75 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77s (1958).
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directly or indirectly for soliciting such exchange. . ."" Also, section
3 (a) (10) exempted securities issued in exchange for bona fide outstand-
ing securities and claims or property interests where the terms and con-
ditions of the issuance and exchange are approved by a governmental au-
thority after a hearing.16 While section 3 (a) (9) was confined to intra-
mural exchanges, i.e., exchanges within a family of shareholders, section
3 (a) (10), although less parochial in permitting exchange of securities
of one corporate entity for those of another, laid down narrow confines
within which such exchanges were exempt.
Legislative History
The legislative history of the Securities Act referred to reorganiza-
tions as follows:
Reorganizations carried out without such judicial swpervision possess all
the dangers implicit in the issuance of new securities and are, there-fore, not exempt from the act. For the same reason the provision [sec-
tion 3(a) (10)] is not broad enough to include mergers or consolida-
tions of corporations entered into without judicial supervision.1 7
Although one writer has stated that this statement "squint[ed] pretty
hard" in the direction of saying that mergers, consolidations, and other
kinds of reorganizations are covered by the registration and prospectus
requirements of the Securities Act,'" Commission Chairman Cohen has
suggested that this statement merely reflected late consideration of the
problem and he therefore doubts its value as a guide. 9 This view is
somewhat confirmed by the absence of any mention of this problem in
the House of Representatives debate on the Securities Act."0 However,
the Federal Trade Commission which administered the Securities Act dur-
ing the year prior to the creation of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission took the apparent hint of Congress and early declared that
mergers and consolidations were subject to the registration and prospectus
requirements."'
Advent of Rule 133
Shortly after the Securities and Exchange Commission assumed re-
sponsibility for administering the Securities Act, its first general counsel
took the position that a merger did not involve a "sale" and therefore was
15. 48 Stat. 75 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1958).
16. Id.
17. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1933). (Emphasis added.)
18. 1 Loss, op. cit. supra note 10, at 519.
19. Cohen, supra note 3, at 171.
20. Note, The SEC's No-Sale Rule and Exchanges of Securities Pursuant to Voluntary Re-
organization, supra note 3, at 1242-44 n.41.
21. Sargent, supra note 3, at 79.
[Vol. 16: 11
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not subject to the registration and prospectus requirements.22 This posi-
tion was formalized in September 1935, when the Commission adopted
a Note to Rule 5 of Form E-i. 23 This Note declared that mergers, con-
solidations, and exchanges of. assets for securities, which were not in-
cluded among the exempt transactions in the Commission's general,
counsel's opinion,24 were exempt from the prospectus and registration
requirements "where, pursuant to statutory provisions or provisions con-
tained in the certificate of incorporation, there is submitted to the vote of
such stockholders a proposal for the transfer of assets of such corporation
to another person in consideration of the issuance of securities of such
other person, or a plan or agreement for a statutory merger or consoli-
dation, provided the vote of a required favorable majority . . ." would
operate to authorize the transaction and bind all stockholders of the cor-
poration except for appraisal rights of dissenters.25
Although Form E-1 as well as Rule 5 and the Note were abol-
ished in 1947, the Commission continued to follow the policy expressed
in the Note by excluding mergers, consolidations, and sales of assets from
the scope of section 5. Then in 1951, the Commission promulgate&
Rule 133 which formally restated the position of the former Note and,
in addition, added to the transactions not within "sale" "reclassifications"
of securities. Rule 133 was born as a Commission interpretation of the
22. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 3762 (March 15, 1957), CCH FED. SEc. L. RiP.
76,511 (1957-61 Transfer Binder).
23. SEC Securities Act Release No. 493 (C) (Sep r 20, 1935).
24. Sargent, supra note 3, at 80. Although there may be uncertainty as to whether there
is a "sile" of securities in a merger or consolidation, none exists in case of an exchange of
assets of a corporation for stock of another corporation. This is dearly a sale of the securities
with the assets constituting the "value" given therefore. Section 2(3), 48 Star. 74 (1933),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1958). The typical "sale of assets" transaction consists gen-
erally of the transfer by one corporation of its assets in bulk to another corporation (or the
subsidiary of another corporation) which in turn issues to the transferor corporation securities
in exchange for the assets, whereupon the transferor corporation liquidates and distributes the
securities to its shareholders. This succession of transactions would probably be exempt from
the registration and prospectus requirements of the Securities Act even without Rule 133: the
transfer of assets in exchange for stock by a corporation would probably be an exempt transac-
tion under § 4(2) of the Securities Act which exempts "transactions by an issuer not involv-
ing any public offering .. ." 48 Star. 77 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 77d (1958), as
amended, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 20, 1964), and the subsequent
distribution to shareholders in liquidation would not constitute a "sale" under the terms of
§ 2(3) since there would not be a disposition for value. See 1 Loss, op. cit. supra note 10,
at 520 n.195.
25. SEC Securities Act Release No. 493(C), at 3 (Sept. 20, 1935).
26. The Commission continued this policy despite the fact that in 1941 the Chairman had
stated to a committee of the House of Representatives that "this, then, is the present situation:
The act as it stands is not dear as to whether the registration provisions apply to the types
of transactions about which I have been speaking. The Commission has interpreted the act
as not applying, and as a result many mergers, consolidations, and reorganizations have been
effected without registration. There can be no douabt that in many instances investors have
suffered as a result." Hearings Before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on
H. R. 4344, 5065, 5832, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 845 (1941). (Emphasis added.)
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word "sale" and related terms contained in section 2(3), and was pre-
sumably made under the Commission's power to "make, amend, and
rescind such rules as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of [the
act] .. ."" To reflect a change in the Internal Revenue Code, Rule
133 was extended in 1954 to include transfers of assets to a subsidiary in
exchange for a parent's stock."8
In 1956, the Commission became concerned about the use of this
Rule as a device to turn loose in the securities markets substantial
amounts of securities without registration or use of a statutory prospectus.
As the Chairman of the Commission expressed it the following year:
It has been extremely disturbing for the Commission to encounter indi-
cations of widespread evasion of the anti-fraud provisions (section 17)
and evasions of the registration requirements (section 5) of the Se-
curities Act through reliance upon claimed exemptions or statutory con-
structions where the facts do not meet the statutory tests or the dear
statutory intent.29
This statement echoed the self-doubt expressed in 1941 when the Com-
mission was concerned with the effect of its Note to Rule 5 of Form E-1.
In a report to Congress the Commission stated that "although the mech-
anism differs from that employed in the ordinary case in which one
security is offered to the public in exchange for another, the net result
is the same; the stockholder in effect is purchasing a new security and
paying for it by turning in his old one."3
27. James C. Sargent (then Commissioner Sargent) has discussed in a provocative fashion
whether the enunciation of Rule 133 was an "interpretive" rule, in which case it must be
shown that it was "necessary to carry out the provisions of the act" or whether it was a defini-
tion, in which case he questions the power of the Commission to define a term expressly
defined in the Securities Act by Congress. Sargent, supra note 3, at 83-85. See also p. 28
Mifra.
28. The differences between a sale of assets which qualifies as a type "C" reorganization
under S 368 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and a sale of assets which qualifies under
Rule 133 should be noted. To qualify under § 368 of the Internal Revenue Code substantially
all of the assets (with a limited qualification) must be transferred, and the transfer must be
solely in consideration for voting stock. Under Rule 133, however, the transfer need not be
of substantially all of the assets and it is not necessary that only voting stock be issued. For that
matter, it is not even required that the exchange be for stock since any securities may qualify.
However, oddly, when Rule 133 was modified in 1954 to recognize the change made in the
Internal Revenue Code which made possible a tax-free reorganization in which the assets
were transferred to a subsidiary in exchange for a parent's stock, to qualify under Rule 133
it was required, as under § 368 of the Internal Revenue Code, that the parent's securities
issued upon transfer of assets to a subsidiary be voting stock. This inconsistency between the
securities required when the transfer is made directly to the issuing corporation and when it
is made to a subsidiary of the issuing corporation probably reflects nothing more than careless
draftsmanship.
29. SEC Securities Act Release No. 3762 (March 15, 1957), CCH FED. SEC. L REP. J
76,511 (1957-61 Transfer Binder). At this time the Commission estimated that over
$100,000,000 in securities had been distributed to the public without registration under the
Rule 133 umbrella.
30. S.E.C. REPORT ON PROPOSALS FOR AMBNDMENTS TO THE SECURITIES Acr OF 1933
AND THE SECURrrIES EXCHANGE Acr OF 1934, 24-25 (1941).
[Vol. 16: 11
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This self-doubt bore fruit in 1.956 when the Commission released a
proposal to reverse the Rule completely and make mergers, consolidations,
sales of assets, and recapitalizations subject to the registration and pro-
spectus requirements of the Securities Act.3' This proposal, although later
abandoned in favor simply of a tightening of the Rule, triggered an in-
tensive reexamination of the whole theory underlying the Rule. Al-
though most segments of the securities bar vigorously defended the ex-
isting Rule, the Commission's staff and the Commissioners themselves
voiced determined repudiations3
Basis for Rule 133
The Rule and its underlying theory are predicated upon two notions:
first, that submission of a proposal for a merger, consolidation, sale of
assets for securities, or a reclassification to a corporation's shareholders as
a body is different from offering to those shareholders on an individual
basis the option of exchanging their securities for others; second, that the
consummation of the transaction, once approved, is essentially different
from the sale of a security to an individual purchaser. The most com-
prehensive statement of the Commission's justification of the Rule- is con-
tained in its brief in National Supply Co. v. Leland Stanford Junior Uni-
versity.
The essence of the Commission's construction... is that in such cases
a proposed corporate act is submitted to stockholders as a class, in their
capacity as members of the corporate body, and that such an act of
submission involves no offer to exchange with any stockholder as an
individual the new securities which may be created as a result of the vote
of stockholders as a class. Even though the stockholder may participate
in the vote which results in changing his rights as a stockholder, his
action in so doing is the action of a member of the corporation exercis-
ing his franchise, rather than the action of a security holder choosing
to accept an offer of exchange made to him as an individual. And
obversely, the solicitation of his vote is a request for the exercise of his
31. SEC Securities Act Release No. 3698 (Oct. 2, 1956). As would be expected, an alert
student of the stage discerned a precedent in Sir William S. Gilbert's "Iolanthe" wherein a
"serious legal problem" was resolved in much the same fashion:
"QUEEN: ... And yet (unfolding a scroll) the law is clear - every fairy must die
who marries a mortal!
LORD
CHANCELLOR: Allow me, as an old Equity draftsman, to make a suggestion. The
subtleties of the legal mind are equal to the emergency. The thing is really quite
simple - the insertion of a single word will do it. Let it stand that every fairy
shall die who doesn't marry a mortal, and there you are, out of your difficulty at
once!"
Letter to S.E.C. from Committee on Administrative Law of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, p. 1 (Jan. 11, 1957), S.E.C. Docket File No. S7-151-1-2, quoted in Purcell,
supra note 3, at 279-80 n.78.
32. See note 3 supra.
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franchise as a member of the corporation, not an offer of exchange or
sale of new securities to him as an individuaL33
Since the controversy abated when the Commission withdrew its pro-
posal to undo the Rule in its entirety and instead tightened the existing
rule, and since it appears that the modified Rule is functioning effectively,
there is little point in a detailed review of the arguments which spiced the
lives of securities lawyers for a period of three years.34 Suffice to say that
the defenders of the status quo pointed out some of the logical absurdities
which would eventuate if mergers and consolidations were brought with-
in the registration and prospectus requirements of the Securities Act.
In the case of consolidation, the argument was raised as to who would
sign the registration statement since there would be no issuer in existence
when the proposal was submitted to the shareholders of the would-be
constituent corporations.3" Moreover, who among the shareholders of
parties to the transaction would have the right to recovery under section
11 of the Securities Act? Should it be only those who voted for the pro-
posal, or should the right also include those who voted against it? Should
it perhaps extend to the shareholders of the surviving corporation in a
merger?" The argument was also raised that the Commission should
be barred from tampering with the Rule since Congress had amended
the Act after adoption of the Rule without modifying the related defini-
tions and thereby gave Congressional acquiescence to the correctness of
the Rule. 7
In addition to countering the specific arguments of the defenders of
the status quo, the proponents of the proposed reversal argued that share-
holders involved in mergers and the like could be swindled, and had been
under the purported umbrella afforded by Rule 133. This could be done
just as effectively as if they were buying securities for cash and they there-
fore needed the protection of the registration provision of the Securities Act
just as much." The proponents also questioned the original exercise of
the Commission's power in interpreting the meaning of a term explicitly
defined by Congress." They argued that the Rule seriously undercut the
33. Brief for the Commission, p. 9, 134 F.2d 689 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 773
(1943). This theory was expressed when the Note to Rule 5 of Form E-1 was promulgated.
SEC Securities Act Release No. 493(C) (Sept. 20, 1935).
34. The controversy, unlike many, generated light as well as heat: most of the perceptive
writing and analysis of Rule 133 was done during this period. See note 3 supra.
35. Throop, In Defense of Rule 133 - A Case for Administrative Self-Restraint, 13 Bus.
LAW. 389, 396 (1958).
36. Purcell, supra note 3, at 285.
37. A.B.A.: Comment on SEC Securities Act Release No. 3698, Proposed Revision of Rule
133, pp. 5-6 (Nov. 25, 1956). SEC Docket File No. S7-151-1-2.
38. SEC Securities Act Release No. 3762 (March 15, 1957), CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
76,511 (1957-61 Transfer Binder).
39. Sargent, supra note 3, at 82-85.
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legislative policy set forth in sections 3(a) (9) and 3(a) (10) pertain-
ing to certain exchanges and supervised reorganizations since it permit-
ted transactions which lay outside the restrictions there stated with anoma-
lous results. For instance', if section 3(a) (10) were repealed court-su-
pervised exchanges would not be exempt, while voluntary exchanges
would be under the Rule. '
The Commission retreated from its proposed elimination of the Rule
under this barrage of criticism and reaffirmed its position that mergers,
consolidationsi sales of assets for securities, and reclassifications did not
involve sales.41 In the process,, however, it defined two situations in
which the disposition of securities received in a reorganization would acti-
vate the registration and prospectus. requir~ements. of the Securities Act. 4'
THE ORIGINAL RULE-
The original Rule 133 is preserved intact in paragraph (a) of the
present Rule, and although not formally 'such, it is in effect a "'transac-
tion exemption."43  The pre-1959 Rule related, and paragraph (a) of
the present Rule relates, to plans or agreements pertaining to four types
of corporate transactions: (1) statutory mergers, (2) statutory consoli-
dations, (3) reclassifications of securities, and '(4) transfers of assets to
a corporation in exchange for its securities or voting stock of a parent
which is, in substance, a type "C" reorganization under section 368 of
the Internal Revenue Code."' The Rule provides that the submission of
a plan or agreement pertaining to one of the above transactions is not
an "offer to sell" or a "sale" if: (1) the submission is pursuant to the
statutory provisions of the state of incorporation or pursuant to provisions
contained in the certificate of incorporation;45 (2) the vote of the re-
quired majority will operate to authorize the transaction so far as con-
cerns the corporation whose shareholders are voting (except for approvals
by directors" and compliance with filing requirements imposed by the
40. Id. at 84-85.
41. SEC Securities Act Release No. 3761 (March 15, 1957), CCH FED. SEc. L REP. a
76,511 (1957-61 Transfer Binder); SEC Securities Act Release No. 4077 (May 4, 1959),
CCH FED. SEC L. REP. 5 76,510 (1957-61 Transfer Binder).
42. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4115 (July 16, 1959).
43. See pp. 12-13 supra, with respect to -transaction' exemptions:
44. See note 24 supra.
45. Under Ohio Law, the directors of a corporation may in the course of winding up the
corporation under a voluntary dissolution "sell its assets at public or private sale." OHIo REv.
CODE § 1701.88(D). If the directors of a corporation may, when the assets are being sold
incident to a dissolution, make a sale of substantially all assets without submission to the
shareholders, is there compliance with this provision of Rule 133 in a liquidation sale for se-
curities even if the directors determine that they will voluntarily submit the proposed sale of
assets to shareholders? The transactions would probably be exempt on other grounds in any
event. See note 24 supra.
46. In Ohio the required authorization of directors for a sale, lease, exchange, or other dis-
position of substantially all the assets of a corporation may come before or after approval of
1964]
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state); and (3) the vote of the required favorable majority will bind all
stockholders of the corporation except to the extent that dissenting share-
holders may have rights under statute or under the certificate of incorpo-
ration to receive the appraised or fair value of their holdings. Thus, if
these conditions exist, submission of the proposal for a merger, consoli-
dation, reclassification, or exchange of assets for securities is not subject
to the registration and prospectus requirements of section 5 of the Securi-
ties Act. While the terms of the Rule do not specifically so provide, the
issuance and delivery of the securities issued in completion of the transac-
tion are likewise exempt from those requirements.
Situations Not Under the Original Rule
Negotiated transactions.-The Commission declared the original Rule
inapplicable in certain circumstances and since it makes up the core of
the present Rule, the amended Rule may still be inapplicable in those
circumstances. For example, under the original Rule the Commission
distinguished transactions entitled to the benefits of the Rule from those
which in fact constituted "negotiated" transactions,' i.e., transactions in
which submission to shareholders was merely a formality because one
shareholder or a controlling group of shareholders was unquestionably
able to vote the required approval. Thus, if the statutes of the state of
incorporation required a majority vote to approve a merger, the Rule
would be inapplicable if one shareholder held more than a majority of the
voting stock. While somewhat unclear, a consequence of this appears
to be that the minority shareholders might have a claim against the
issuer for violation of section 12 (1), which gives a right of rescission if
section 5 is violated, as it might be if the exemption afforded by Rule
133 were not applicable. The minority shareholders would probably be
able to dispose of the securities they received under section 4(1), which
exempts transactions not involving an issuer, underwriter, or dealer. On
the other hand, dominating shareholders would be unable for some time
to dispose of the securities they received since they might be deemed un-
derwriters and therefore without an exemption.48
Transactions requiring unanimous approval.-A second type of trans-
action to which the original Rule was considered inapplicable was one
the shareholders. OHIO REV. CODE § 1701.76(A). In the case of a merger or consolidation,
however, the directors' approval must be prior to the submission to the shareholders. OHIO
REv. CODE § 1701.79(A).
47. Great Sweet Grass Oils Ltd., 37 S.E.C. 683 (1957), afJd per curiam, 256 F.2d 893
(D.C. Cir. 1958); Kroy Oils Ltd., petition for review withdrawn, D.C. Cir. No. 13, 920,
Dec. 10, 1958; Purcell, supra note 3, at 275-76.
48. The Commission does not generally regard the ordinary investor as an "underwriter"
even if he purchases the securities with a view to their redistribution. 1 Loss, op. cit. supra
note 10, at 642-43.
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requiring unanimous approval, such as a sale of substantially all of a
corporation's assets which, in the absence of a statute, requires unanimous
shareholder approval.4 The Commission felt that the, underlying justi-
fication of the Rule was not apposite to such a transaction. Because each
shareholder was individually capable of defeating the transaction, share-
holder consent approached more closely the type of individual choice
which was considered tantamount to the sale of a security than did the
typical merger, consolidation, reclassification, or sale of assets.5
Shareholder option.-The third type of transaction was one in which
the shareholders had a choice of receiving one of two or more securi-
ties, i.e., where shareholders in a reorganization might choose between pre-
ferred and common stock: Again, the Commission apparently believed
that the element of individual choice prevailed over the "corporate deci-
sion" justification of the Rule.5
Transactions pursuant to a pre-existing plan.-Finally, the Commis-
sion regarded transactions ostensibly under Rule 133, but which in truth
were conducted pursuant to a pre-existing plan to distribute securities to
the public, as outside the Rule. This was especially true where the issuer
and the persons in control of the issuer were involved in post-merger, post-
consolidation, or post-sale dealings in the securities, or where such persons
had knowledge of the plans for distribution by recipients in the Rule 133
transaction. 2 Clearly these transactions were public offerings outside the
underlying policy of Rule 133, and, therefore, were subject to the regis-
tration and prospectus requirements.
Effect of amendments.-The extent to which these limitations remain
valid since the 1959 amendments is doubtful, especially since in a large
measure the amendments codify them. Also, there is evidence that the
Commission is now less concerned with the application of some of them.53
The reason is apparent: the new Rule imposes strict limitations on the
capacity of persons in control of the predecessor corporation to dispose of
their securities. For example, it abolishes the would-be opportunity to use
Rule 133 to "free up" stock in a negotiated transaction. Likewise, the
possibility of relying on the Rule to effect a "pass through" of securities
- using a Rule 133 transaction as a means to peddle securities to the
public without registration - has been sharply curtailed. However, the
49. 1 HoRmsTmN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRAcricE, 467-68 (1959).
50. Purcell, supra note 3, at 277.
51. The Commission has been critidzed for its inconsistency in refusing to apply Rule 133
to this option, while applying the Rule to an option between taking cash as a dissenter or
accepting securities of the surviving corporation. Note, The SECs No-Sale Rule and Exchanges
of Securities Pursuant to Voluntary Reorganization, supra note 3, at 1239-40.
52. Purcell, supra note 3, at 277.
53. See PRACIcING LAW INSTITUTE, S.E.C. PROBLEMS OF CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDERS
AND UNDERw1rrINGs 126 (Israels ed. 1962).
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status of the Commission's position on transactions requiring unanimous
approval and those allowing a shareholder option is somewhat less dear
since the amendments do not expressly deal with these situations.
THE 1959 AMENDMENTS
The 1959 amendments deal exclusively with the disposition of se-
curities involved in a Rule 133 transaction after the completion of the
transaction. The amendments, however, did not .change the original
Rule's mandate (paragraph (a) of the amended Rule) that Rule 133
transactions are not sales or offers to sell. Furthermore, even if the
strictures in paragraphs (b) and (c) of the amended Rule ultimately
require registration, the initial step by which the securities replaced the
securities of a predecessor corporation remains outside the registration
and prospectus requirements of section 5.
Misconceptions Under the Original Rule
The 1959 amendments grew out of a widely held misconception -
one often deliberate and sometimes innocent. In stating that the submis-
sion of a proposal for merger, consolidation, reclassification, or sale of
assets in exchange for securites did not constitute an offer to sell or a
sale, and in implying that the subsequent delivery of securities did not
constitute a sale or delivery after sale, the Rule invited the conclusion that
a subsequent disposition of securities received in the course of a Rule 133
transaction enjoyed the benefits of another exemption under section 4 (1).
This provision exempts "transactions by any person other than an issuer,
underwriter, or dealer... ."" Since transactions by a dealer are exempt
unless they occur within certain relatively short time intervals and are re-
lated to a public offering, the exemption depended on whether an issuer
or underwriter (by definition) was involved in the transaction. It was a
simple matter to conclude that one receiving securities in a Rule 133
transaction and in turn selling those securities was not an issuer. Since
under Rule 133 there was no sale involved in transferring securities to
the shareholders of the predecessor corporation, it was easy to conclude
that no underwriter was involved, since an "underwriter" is defined as
one who purchases from an issuer with a view to the distribution of any
security (how could there be a "purchase" if there was no "sale"?), or
one who offers or sells for an issuer in connection with the distribution
of any security (how could a shareholder of a predecessor company be
offering or selling for the issuer?)."5 Thus, it became common to look
54. 48 Stat. 77 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1958), as amended, Pub. L No.
88-467, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 20, 1964).
55. See 48 Stat. 75 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1958).
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upon Rule 133 as a device for distributing securities without concern
for the stringencies of the registration and prospectus requirements of
the Securities Act.
Why the Amendments
The Great Sweet Grass Oils Ltd. and the Kroy Oils Ltd. cases vividly
illustrated the extent to which Rule 133 was improperly relied upon,"e
and unquestionably hardened the Commission's thinking on this problem.
There the Commission secured withdrawal of the registration of Great
Sweet Grass and Kroy Oils stocks listed on the American Stock Exchange.
The Commission found that in several instances, some of which were
clearly sham transactions, both corporations issued stock ostensibly in
exchange for the properties of other corporations, after which the recip-
ients distributed the stock to the public through securities dealers only
properly describable as "boiler shops." Often the recipients were "dum-
mies" for persons in control of the issuing corporation, and in one in-
stance a dormant corporation was apparently revived to facilitate the
transactions.
Among the grounds for withdrawal of the registrations, the Com-
mission alleged that both corporations, in their current reports57 filed
with the Commission, misrepresented that the securities in question were
issued pursuant to the exemption under Rule 133. In withdrawing the
registration of Great Sweet Grass the Commission stated:
However, this [the "no-sale" theory] does not mean that the stock
issued under such a plan is "free" stock which need not be registered
insofar as subsequent sales are concerned. Unless the Securities Act
provides an exemption for a subsequent sale of such non-registered
stock, registration would be required. Of course, subsequent casual sales
of such stock by non-controlling stockholders which follow the normal
pattern of trading in the stock would be deemed exempt from the pro-
visions of Section 5 of that Act as transactions not involving an issuer,
underwriter or dealer under Section 4(1) of the Securities Act. How-
ever, if the issuer or persons acting on its behalf participate in arrange-
ments for a distribution to the public of any of the stock issued to stock-
holders or have knowledge of a plan of distribution by, or concerted
action on the part of, such stockholders to effect a public distribution
in connection with the transaction, a Section 4(1) exemption would
not be available since an underwriting within the meaning of the
statute would be involved ... Where there is a pre-existing plan, as
in this case, to use stockholders merely as a conduit for the distribution
of a substantial amount of securities to the public, Rule 133 cannot be
relied upon by the issuer ... In any event, where the persons negotiat-
ing an exchange, merger or similar transaction have sufficient control
56. Great Sweet Grass Oils Ltd., 37 S.E.C. 683 (1957).
57. See Form 8-K upon which corporations listed on exchanges and issuers which have had
offerings registered under the Securities Act and certain others report significant and material
corporate events.
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of the voting stock to make a vote of stockholders a mere formality,
Rule 133 does not apply.58
While this case is demonstrative of the abuses of Rule 133 which moved
the Commission to action, it also provided ammunition for the opponents
of the proposed amendments. They argued that the Commission's ad-
judicative process could adequately deal with abuses of Rule 133, thus
obviating the necessity of raising questions as to the Commission's power
to make the suggested amendments.
Amendment Coverage - Underwriter Defined
The amendments were intended to deal with two situations: first,
where the issuer, or an affiliate'9 of the issuer, arranges for the sale of
securities received in a Rule 133 transaction; second, where a predecessor
company or an affiliate of a predecessor company disposes of securities
received in a Rule 133 transaction.
In formulating the amendments the Commission used the Securities
Act's unique and flexible concept of "underwriter." This term derives
much of its importance from its use in section 4(1) wherein "transac-
tions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer . . .,"
are exempt from the registration and prospectus requirements of section
5. While the terms "issuer"'" and "dealer" 2 are precisely defined, the
term "underwriter" is very broad in scope; it includes anyone who:
(1) purchases from an issuer with a view to the distribution of a security,
(2) offers or sells for an issuer in connection with the distribution of a
security, or (3) participates directly or indirectly in any such undertaking
or in the underwriting of any such undertaking. " Anyone who does any
of these is a statutory underwriter, regardless of whether he is engaged
in the securities business.
The definition of "underwriter" concludes by stating that " ' issuer '
shall include, in addition to an issuer [used here and later in this sentence
in the conventional sense as one who issues a security], any person di-
rectly or indirectly controlling or controlled by the issuer, or any person
58. 37 S.E.C. 683, 690-91 (1957). ( Emphasis added.)
59. "[A] person that directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls, or
is controlled by, or is under common control with, the person specified." Rule 405, 17
C.F.R. § 230.405 (rev. ed. 1964).
60. 48 Star. 77 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1958), as amended, Pub. L No.
88-467, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 20, 1964).
61. "[EJvery person who issues or proposes to issue any security .... Section 2(4), 48
Star. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1958).
62. "[A]ny person who engages either for all or part of his time, directly or indirectly, as
agent, broker, or principal, in the business of offering, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing
or trading in securities issued by another person." Section 2(12), 48 Star. 75 (1933), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1958).
63. See § 2(11), 48 Stat. 75 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 5 77b (1958).
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under direct or indirect common cofitrol with the issuer." 4  In effect,
then, an underwriter is one who: (1) purchases from an issuer or con-
trolling person with a view to distribution, (2) offers or sells for an
issuer or controlling person in connection with a distribution, or (3) has
a participation in any such undertaking. It is through this subtlety that
distributions of securities by controlling persons are subjected to the stric-
tures of the Securities Act The key term "distribution" as used in the
definition of "underwriter" is generally considered synonymous with a
"public offering."" A public offering, then, actual or intended, is a
prerequisite to the presence of an "underwriter."
Rule 133 Underwriters
As noted previously, a recipient of a security in a Rule 133 transac-
tion must look to some other exemption to dispose lawfully of the security
without registration or use of a prospectus. The exemption most often
used is found in section 4(1) which exempts transactions by any person
other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer. To thwart abuse of Rule
133, the Commission placed that section's exemption beyond the reach
of certain persons in certain circumstances by designating two classes of
underwriters. This designation effectively hindered ready distribution of
securities issued in Rule 133 transactions if such persons were involved.
Contractual underwriters.-The first person designated as an under-
writer under the amendment has been called a "contractual underwriter."
He is characterized as one who purchases the securities of an issuer corpo-
ration from the security holders of a predecessor corporation with a view
to distribution, or who offers or sells such securities for the security
holders in connection with a distribution, pursuant to a contract or arrange-
ment made in connection with the Rule 133 transaction with the issuer,
an affiliate67 of the issuer, or someone who is himself an underwriter of
such securities in connection with the transaction.
This classification arose out of the type of situation described in the
64. Ibid.
65. Orrick, Some Interpretative Problems Respecting the Registration Requirements Under
the Securities Act, 13 Bus. IAw. 369, 370 (1958). Doubt that the-terms are synonymous
has been expressed by Manuel F. Cohen, now Chairman of the Commission. Cohen, Rule 133
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 14 REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B. 162 (1959).
66. The so-called "private offering exemption," as stated in the Securities Act, is confined
to issuers: "transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering.. Thus, technically
the Securities Act affords no private offering exemption to controlling persons. However,
because the term "underwriter" is defined in terms of a "distribution" which is commonly
regarded as tantamount to a public offering, an offering by a controlling person which is
confined in the same manner in which a private offering would be made by an issuer, cannot
involve an underwriter and therefore would be exempt under the exemption of § 4(1): "tran-
sactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer.... " 48 Stat. 77 (1933),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1958), as amended, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
(Aug. 20, 1964).,
67. See note 59 supra.
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Great Sweet Grass Oils Ltd. and Kroy Oils Ltd. cases. 8 To some extent
those cases are somewhat unrepresentative since they involved chicanery,
fraud, and sham which reach far beyond a simple misuse of Rule 133.
The somewhat more typical misuse situation is where some or all of the
shareholders of a merging or predecessor corporation wish to secure cash
for their interests, with the acquiring corporation either not in a position to
make a cash transaction or not desiring to do so. Often, tax considera-
tions may also be pertinent where some shareholders prefer a tax-free
transaction with a continuing equity in the surviving enterprise, while
others prefer liquidation. In these circumstances, not infrequently the
transaction would be cast in the mold of a Rule 133 transaction, but the
issuer or those in control would arrange to dispose of the securities of
those who preferred cash through securities dealers or others. The end
result would be the same as if the issuer had offered and sold the securi-
ties for cash (transactions which would in many instances require regis-
tration), and paid the proceeds to some or all of the shareholders of the
acquired corporation; the issuer would have the other enterprise, some
or all of the shareholders of the precedessor would have cash, and the
public would have securities which they had purchased. But - and here
a significant difference exists - they would likely have them with the
valuable protections afforded by the Securities Act.
The contractual underwriter designation goes beyond simply defeat-
ing fraud. It encompasses all transactions in which the issuer or a con-
trolling person is involved in arrangements to dispose of the securities
received in a Rule 133 transaction. Thus, the person who arranges with
the issuer or its affiliate to dispose of the securities becomes a statutory
underwriter and the section 4 (1) exemption is unavailable; and absent
another exemption, the securities are subject to registration under section 5.
It should be noted that the person from whom the contractual un-
derwriter purchases or on whose behalf he distributes need not be in
control of either the issuing or the disappearing or selling corporation.
A purchase from a minor shareholder with a view to distribution, or an
offering or sale on behalf of that shareholder may also render the trans-
action violative of section 12(1)9 which affords a civil action for dam-
ages.
This result gives rise to various questions. For example, the selling
security holder or the security holder on whose behalf the distribution is
68. Great Sweet Grass Oils Ltd., 37 S.E.C. 683 (1957).
69. Section 12(1) states that "any person who - (1) offers or sells a security in violation
of Section 5 . .. shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue
either at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration
paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon,
upon the tender of such security or for damages if he no longer owns the security." 48 Star.
84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1958).
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made is clearly not the issuer of the securities, and may not have a con-
trolling interest in either the issuer or predecessor corporation; how then
can one dealing with such a person be an "underwriter" when that
definition requires involvement of the issuer or an affiliate, usually a
person in control of or controlled by the issuer? Further, the amendment
expanding the definition of "underwriter" was apparently adopted under
the Commission's authority to define "accounting, technical, and trade
terms" used in the Securities Act."0 Does it constitute a proper exercise
of this authority when the term is defined within the act itself? In-oth er
words, when Congress has defined a term, may the Commission extend
or alter that definition?7  In any event, the Commission -justified its
position. on the ground that the application of paragraph (b) depends
on the existence of a relationship between the putative underwriter and
the issuer or an affiliate; therefore, the distribution.is in effect made on
behalf of the issuer or affiliate, even though the benefits may. not accrue
to either. 2
Despite this and other possible difficulties the Commission's under-
lying approach was accepted by the securities bar."3 However, at the
bar's suggestion a sentence was added to indicate that the definition did
not apply to arrangements made to match fractional shares, or to pur-
chases and sales in connection with such matching.
Control underwriters.-Paragraph (c) of the amended Rule which
states the second definition of underwriter was less kindly received by
commentators."4 This provision defined underwriter as any constituent
corporation (defined as any corporation which is a party to a Rule 133
transaction other than the issuer) or affiliate of a constituent corporation
who acquires securities of the issuer in connection with a Rule 133 trans-
action with a view to their distribution. At the behest of the American
Bar Association's Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities,75 the
Commission amended the rule as originally proposed to exclude from
the term "distribution" a distribution by a constituent corporation to
its security holders upon a complete or partial liquidation. The excluded
situation usually occurs in a sale of assets for stock when the corporation
dissolves and distributes the proceeds (the securities) together with any
retained assets to its shareholders.
70. Section 19(a), 48 Stat. 85 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77s (1958).
71. This is the same problem mentioned previously in connection with the Commission's
narrowing of the definition of the term "sale" despite the fact that Congress defined it as part
of the Securities Act. See pp. 23-24 supra.
72. 1 Loss, SEctnrrlEs REGULATiON 234-35 (2d ed. 1961).
73. Committee Report, Proposed SEC Rule 133 - Comments of Committee on Federal
Regulation of Securities, 14 Bus. LAw. 423, 426 (1959).
74. Id. at 429-31; Throop, Recent Developments with Respect to Rule 133, 15 Bus. LAw.
119, 122 (1959).
75. Committee Report, supra note 73, at 429.
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In the typical situation arising under this paragraph, the controlling
shareholders of the disappearing or selling corporation will receive some
of the securities issued, either immediately as in a merger or consolidation,
or somewhat later, as where the securities are issued in a sale of assets
transaction to the selling corporation which in turn distributes them to
its shareholders. If the securities are taken by controlling persons with a
view to distribution, they become underwriters and their dispositions of
securities are not exempt under section 4(1). However, absent a situa-
tion within the purview of paragraph (b), the section 4(1) exemption
remains available to persons other than the constituent corporation and
its controlling shareholders. This provision requires the issuer to exercise
considerable caution to avoid an inadvertent violation of the Securities
Act.76 It also requires foresight by the putative controlling shareholders
to avoid being "locked in" with a nonmarketable security."
Problems of paragraph (c).-Paragraph (c) was in some measure a
reflection of the Commission's previous refusal to apply the original Rule
133 to situations where shareholder approval was reduced to a formality
by a controlling group. In other words, this occurs where the trans-
action, rather than being corporate action by the shareholders, was in
truth simply a "negotiated transaction.""8  The provision, in effect,
limits the marketability of securities received by the corporation and
its controlling shareholders. It does not, however, restrict the submission
to the shareholders and the issuance of securities to them.
The semantic problems raised by paragraph (c), and to some extent
by paragraph (b), are illustrated by the conclusions of the Commission
staff out of which the 1959 amendments grew:
CONCLUSION I.
We do not agree with the proposition that the transactions described
in Rule 133 do not involve a "sale" within the meaning of that term
as defined in section 2(3) of the Securities Act and that, therefore,
the Securities Act has no application to such transactions ....
CONCLUSION II.
We believe that the Commission has the power to promulgate or to
continue in effect rules of interpretation or rules of definition which
76. If a controlling person of a constituent corporation takes securities in a transaction
otherwise within Rule 133 without the requisite investment intent, then, at least as to those
securities, Rule 133 does not provide an exemption from the provisions of § 5. Therefore,
the issuer may be deemed to have violated S 5 (a) (1) by selling the securities without a regis-
tration statement being effective, 5 5 (a) (2) by causing the securities to be carried through
the mails or by other means or instruments of interstate commerce for the purpose of sale or
delivery after sale, and § 5(b) (2) by causing the securities to be carried through the mails
or by other means or instruments of interstate commerce for the purpose of said sale or de-
livery after sale without their being accompanied by a statutory prospectus. 48 Stat 77
(1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1958).
77. See p. 39 infra.
78. See p. 20 supra.
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have the effect of declaring that transactions are not "sales" for purposes
of sections 4 and 5 of the Act where the Commission concludes on the
basis of its experience and the overall structure of the Act that the
procedural and liability provisions of the Act as they affect issuers, un-
derwriters and dealers would not operate reasonably and effectively in
such transactions ....
CONCLUSION IV.
We believe that a. stockholder acquiring a new security in a transaction
falling within Rule 133 "has purchased" that security from an issuer
within the meaning of section 2(11) and accordingly certain stock-
holders may be defined as underwriters if they acquire the security
with a view to distribution, and that in many cases this result conforms
to the structure and policy of the Act. We believe, however, that or-
dinary investors not in a control relationship with any corporation
participating in the transaction should not be defined as underwriters,
although participation by the issuer in resales by them should require
registration by the issuer....j9
In effect, Conclusions I and II state that even though transactions such
as mergers are sales within the meaning of the term "sale" as used in
the act, the Commission may declare them to be otherwise. This seems
to imply that the Commission may completely reverse Congressional
policy by simply taking a position contrary to the express language of the
statute. In mitigation of the apparent presumptuousness of the staff's
position concerning the Commission's power, it should be noted that
section 2, which defines such terms as "sale" and "sell," provides that
"unless the context otherwise requires .. ."' the definitions contained
in the Securities Act must be followed; and the Commission is given
the power to define "accounting, technical and trade terms" used in the
Securities Act.
Relying upon the prefatory language of section 2, at least one court
has carefully analyzed the wording of section 5 (a) (1) and concluded
that. "sell" in that context is narrower in meaning than "sell" in section
12(2). s8 Also, one commentator has remarked upon the anomaly in
the text of the Securities Act whereby agreements (including presumably
sales) between issuers and affiliates and underwriters are excluded from
the definition of "sell" and related terms in section 2 (3), although
they are clearly included within the meaning of "sell" in section
2(11), and although undoubtedly underwriters would regard them-
selves - and rightly so - as entitled to relief under section 12(1)
which makes a seller liable to his buyer if he offers or sells a security
in violation of section 5."2 In any event, the question is still pertinent
79. SEC Securities Act Release No. 3965 (Sept. 15, 1958), CCH FED. Sic. L. R P. 5
76,609 (1957-61 Transfer Binder).
80. 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (1958). (Emphasis added.)
81. Schillner v. H. Vaughan Clarke & Co., 143 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1943).
82. Cohen, Rule 133 of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 14 REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A.
176-77 (1959).
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as to whether limitations possibly implied by the context justify affirma-
tive Commission intervention by means of definition to formulate a sub-
stantive policy when Congress has deliberately given the term a very
broad meaning.
The staff reaches other interesting conclusions. While declaring that
the Commission may define "sale" and related terms to exclude the sub-
mission to shareholders of a defined proposal and the vote thereon, none-
theless in some circumstances a shareholder receiving securities in a Rule
133 transaction may be regarded as having purchased the same securities
which in the very same transaction were not sold, thereby bringing him-
self within the definition of underwriter, one who ... has purchased
from an issuer. . . ." Regardless of the questionable semantic under-
pinnings of this paragraph (c), this is the rule and there may thus be in
effect a one-sided coin.
Finally, paragraph (c) contains a further refinement in that not
every recipient of securities in a Rule 133 transaction is considered to
have purchased them. Rather, only constituent corporations and their
affiliates are considered to be purchasers, while non-affiliated recipients
are excluded. This result, no matter how questionable logically, is con-
sistent with the Commission's position that ordinary investors who pur-
chase securities, even with a view to distribution, are not included within
the term "underwriter" and therefore may dispose of the securities at any
time under the section 4(1) exemption.8 3
This anomaly forced the Commission to adopt a means of mitigating
the rigors of a rule which allowed non-control persons to dispose of un-
limited amounts of securities without registration, while barring con-
trolling persons from disposing of any. Accordingly, the Commission
recognized anew that the Securities Act of 1933 is principally concerned
with the distribution of securities and is not intended to pose obstacles
to normal trading activity in securities.' This basic distinction underlies
the exemption afforded by section 4(4) (section 4(2) prior to the 1964
amendments) which exempts from section 5 "brokers' transactions, exe-
cuted upon customers' orders on any exchange or in the over-the-counter
market but not the solicitation of such orders." 5  After many adminis-
trative problems with this exemption," the Commission codified the dis-
tinction in Rule 154 which permits limited dispositions of securities by
controlling persons.
83. 1 Loss, op. cit. supra note 72, at 642-43.
84. MCopNMcK, UNDERsTANDING THE SEcuRT s AcT AND T S.E.C. 99 (1948).
85. 48 Star. 77 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77(d), as amended, Pub. L No. 88-467,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 20, 1964). Professor Loss has remarked that pre-amendment
S 4(2) was not a "model of clarity," 1 Loss, op. cit, supra note 72, at 698.
86. Ira Haupt & Co., 23 S.E.C 589 (1946).
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Paragraphs (d) and (e)
Concessions to controlling interests.-To afford persons in control
of constituent corporations at least some of the latitude given others in
disposing securities, the Commission formulated two paragraphs of the
amended Rule based on Rule 154 and thereby permitted limited trading
activity by controlling persons. It must be carefully noted that para-
graphs (d) and (e) are only applicable to paragraph (c); ihey do not
affect the contractual underwriter under paragraph (b).Subject to complete compliance with the restrictive provisions of
paragraphs (d) and (e), a constituent corporation or affiliate may, with-
out being considered an'underwriter or involved in a distribution, within
'any six-mohth period sell, in the case of an unlisted security, approxi-
mately one percent of the shares or units of the security, outstanding at
the time the broker receives the order to execute the transaction, and, in
the case of a listed security, the lesser of such one'percent and the largest
aggregate reported volume of trading in the security on securities ex-
changes during any one week within the four calendar weeks preceding
receipt of the order. Thus, by complying with the other provisions of
these paragraphs and by complying with the limitations contained in
Commission policy not stated in the Rule, a controlling person other-
wise subject to the restraints imposed by paragraph (c) may divest him-
self of some of the securities received in the Rule 133 traisaction. How-
ever, it is important to note that the numerical limit is in terms of the
securities of the issuing corporation outstanding at the time the broker
receives the order. Thus, for instance, if the security issued is unlisted
and the acquisition is small in terms of the percentage of shares issued
to the predecessor corporation or its shareholders, a controlling person
of the acquired company may be able to dispose of a substantial portion,
and in some situations, all of the securities received by him.
Solicitation.-Other provisions of paragraphs (d) and (e) of Rule
133 must be meticulously observed. Neither the selling security holder
nor his broker may directly or indirectly solicit or arrange for the solicita-
tion of purchase orders in anticipation of, or in connection with, the trans-
action. This, of course, in the case of a security with a limited market,
may make disposition difficult since it forbids any sales effort in dispos-
ing of the securities. Because of the specialist's function, the problem is
considerably alleviated if the security is listed on an exchange since there
is usually a buyer available (the specialist), though the offering of a
large number of shares may drive the price down.
To some extent, the impact of this limitation is lessened by the further
provision that an inquiry concerning a dealer's written bid for a security
or his written solicitation of an offer to sell made within the previous
sixty days is not considered a solicitation of an order to buy. Thus, a
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broker may go through the so-called "pink sheets""7 for the preceding 60
days and inquire of the dealers who had bids listed.
The solicitation activity forbidden is solicitation of buy orders and
not the solicitation of sell orders. Accordingly, a broker's initiative in ap-
proaching the controlling person of a constituent corporaton and seeking
his order to sell does not bar reliance on this exemption.
Distribution.-The selling security holder may not make any pay-
ment in connection with the execution of an otherwise permitted trans-
action to any person other than his broker, and the broker may perform
only the usual and customary broker's functions. The broker is pro-
hibited from doing more than executing an order to sell as a broker and
receiving more than the usual or customary broker's commissions. He
must not be aware of any circumstances indicating that his principal is
failing to comply with the provisions of paragraph (d).88 These provi-
sions are intended to preclude the activities generally associated with the
distribution of securities as distingushed from those pertinent to trading
in securities.
It is clear that this "out" for the controlling shareholder only con-
templates dispositions in straight brokerage transactions, i.e., transactions
through persons engaged in the securities business who act as agents for
the seller and do not purchase the securities on their own account for
subsequent resale to customers.
Other limitations.-The Commission has insisted that the analogous
Rule 154 pertaining to brokers' transactions exempts only the broker's
participation in the transaction and not that of the controlling person
who is selling the securities; he, according to the Commission, must look
to sections other than section 4(4) and its explicative Rule 154 for insu-
lation against liability.8"
It does not appear that paragraphs (d) and (e) of Rule 133 protect
only the broker. As noted earlier, exemption for a person who sells se-
curities received in a Rule 133 transaction must be found elsewhere than
in Rule 133. In general, the exemption applicable is found in section
4(1). Paragraph (c) intends to deny to constituent corporations and
their affiliates who take with a view to distribution that exemption by
designating them as underwriters. The beginning of paragraph (d) ap-
pears to restore that exemption by declaring that upon compliance with
paragraphs (d) and (e) such a person "shall not be deemed to be an
underwriter nor to be engaged in a distribution with respect to securities
87. Compendiums published daily by the National Quotation Bureau, Inc. which contain the
quotations of dealers throughout the country with respect to virtually all securities traded
actively over-the-counter.
88. This paragraph limits the amount of securities which may be sold and restricts the
seller's solicitations and payments.
89. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4469 (1964); 1 Loss, op. cit. supra note 72, at 697-98.
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acquired in any transaction specified in paragraph (a). .. ."" Thus, para-
graphs (d) and (e) apparently provide protection for both the broker
and the selling security holder by making available to both the exemption
in section 4 ( 1 ), and to the broker the exemption in section 4 (4) as well.
However, other limitations which the Commission has applied to
Rule 154 appear to be equally applicable to paragraphs (d) and (e) of
Rule 133. The Commission reads "person" in Rule 154 as more than a
single individual; it construes it to mean groups such as members of an
immediate family. Such a group may not, in the aggregate, exceed the
numerical limit on the disposition of securities within a six month
period.9 The Commssion has not gone so far as to regard all members
of a controlling. group as a single person for purposes of Rule 154, and
it has on one occasion indicated in a "no action" letter that each of three
family groups which in concert controlled a company was a "person" for
purposes of that Rule.
TheCommission has regarded reliance upon Rule 154 in several suc-
cessive or nearly successive six month periods, especially where the maxi-
mum amounts are disposed of each time, as indicative of a distribution
rather than trading, and hence the exemption would not be available. 2
Presumably, the Commission has the same attitude with respect to such
repeated reliance upon paragraphs (d) and (e) of Rule 133.
The numerical limits of paragraph (d) do not apply solely to se-
curities disposed of under Rule 133. Rather, there must be included in
determining whether a proposed disposition will exceed the six month
limitation "all other sales of securities of the same class by such person
or on his behalf within the preceding six months ... ."" Thus, if a per-
son makes a private placement, an offering under Regulation A, or even,
for that matter, a registered offering of securities of the same class within
the six month period, the amounts thus sold are charged against the maxi-
mum allowable in determining the amount which may be offered at a
particular moment. The obvious implication is that a person may not
use Rule 154 to dispose of the maximum allowable thereunder and dur-
ing the same six month period rely upon paragraphs (d) and (e) of Rule
133 to dispose of a similar quantity.94
In summary, if the requirements of paragraph (a) of Rule 133 are
met, the Rule permits, without the necessity of registration or use of a
statutory prospectus, submission of merger, consolidation, reclassification,
and sale of assets proposals to the vote of shareholders, the vote thereon
90. Rule 133 (d).
91. PRACTiaNG LAW INSTiUTE, op. cit. supra note 53, at 115.
92. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4469 (1964).
93. Rule 133(d) (3). (Emphasis added.)
94. PRACTiCING LAW INsrrrurrB, op. cit. supra note 53, at 114.
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by the shareholders, and the delivery of the securities after approval. By
inference the Rule confirms the right of recipients to later dispose of se-
curities received except in cases of dispositions arranged by the issuer or
an affiliate, and dispositions by a constituent corporation or a person in
control thereof if the securities were taken with a view to distribution.
The strictures of paragraph (c) are tempered by a limited right of dispo-
sition in brokerage transactions under paragraphs (d) and (e).
Fo1M S-14
Original Form S-14
In connection with the amendments to Rule 133, the Commission
also adopted a new registration form for securities issued in a Rule 133
transaction which the underwriters described in paragraphs (b) and (c)
might wish to distribute (otherwise, for paragraph (c) underwriters, than
through "brokerage" transactions under paragraphs (d) and (e) of the
amended Rule).
The usefulness of Form S-14 was limited since its use was originally
confined to registrants subject to the Commission's proxy rules (Regula-
tion 14 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), for the most part
corporations with securities listed on an exchange, which had solicited
proxies under Commission rules in connection with the Rule 133 transac-
tion. Also, it was the issuer of the securities which had to be subject to
the proxy rules and use a conforming proxy statement, rather than the
selling or disappearing corporation; thus, where the selling corporation
was listed and utilized a conforming proxy statement and the issuing
corporation was not subject to the proxy rules or did not use a proxy
statement, Form S-14 was not available. 5  Obviously, Form S-14 would
95. Section 14 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act and the rules promulgated by the Securities
and Exchange Commission thereunder do not require a listed corporation (nor under the
recent amendments an unlisted corporation) to solicit proxies with regard to any matter,
although the New York Stock Exchange and other exchanges do. Rather, it is required that in
the event proxies are solicited certain information must be furnished to the persons from whom
solicited with respect to the issuer and the matters to be voted upon. The recently enacted
amendments to the securities acts added § 14(c) to the Securities Exchange Act wherein the
Commission is given authority to promulgate rules and regulations requiring an issuer to send
to the holders of listed securities and the holders of certain securities of larger unlisted issuers,
the same information required in proxy solicitations. This is true even if no solicitation
is made.
While the Commission has not stated its position on this matter, it is probable that the
disqualification from use of a Form S-14 registration statement because of failure of the issuer
to use a proxy statement is now obsolete inasmuch as the information otherwise contained
in a proxy statement may, after the regulations are promulgated, have to be submitted to
shareholders anyway. It should be noted that the proxy regulations with respect to unlisted
companies will apply only to registered securities, that is, securities which are held by more
than 750 record holders (500 after a period of two years). While unlikely, the possibility
exists that the securities for which proxy statements are sent will not be required to be regis-
tered, while other securities of the same issuer will be registered because of the number of
holders. It would appear that in such circumstances Form S-14 would not be available since
the issuer would not be required to solicit proxies nor to furnish to the security holders the
information pursuant to such regulations as may be promulgated under the new § 14 (c).
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rarely be available in a sale of assets transaction since there generally
would be no necessity or occasion for the acquiring corporation to seek
shareholder approval for such a transaction; usually only director ap-
proval would be necessary, assuming sufficient authorized shares, to au-
thorize the transaction for the buyer."8 Those companies not subject to
the proxy rules, or which though subject had not solicited proxies, were
relegated to the use of some other form, principally Form S-i, which in-
volved a somewhat more difficult and cumbersome procedure.
Form S-14 Under 1964 Amendments
Under the 1964 amendments97 to the federal securities laws, for the
first time the larger unlisted corporations became subject to the Commis-
sion's proxy rules and to the other statutory requirements previously ap-
plicable only to listed corporations. The 1964 amendments provided
that within 120 days following the end of their first fiscal year ending
after June 30, 1964,"8 unlisted corporations with more than $1,000,000
in assets and more than 750 holders of a class of equity security, must
register the equity security with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Upon effectiveness of the registration they become subject, as to that class
of security, to the proxy requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,9" and thus presumably may use Form S-14 in connection with the
distribution of securities issued in Rule 133 transactions.
Schedule 14A.-The core of a Form S-14 registration statement is
the information required under Schedule 14A of Regulation 14 under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to be included in a proxy statement
pertaining to the Rule 133 transaction. Hence, the starting point for a
Form S-14 registration statement is usually the proxy statement dis-
tributed to shareholders of the acquiring corporation. Generally, the
pages of the proxy statement containing notice of the meeting are elimi-
nated and printed pages containing the information required by Form S-14
to be included in the prospectus in addition to that in the proxy state-
ment are simply "wrapped around" the proxy statement, giving rise to the
description of many prospectuses forming part of Form S-14 registration
statements as "wrap around prospectuses." In effect, the prospectus por-
96. Shareholder approval is in some circumstances for Ohio corporations necessary under a
recently enacted amendment to the Ohio General Corporation Law. See OHIo REV. CODE
§ 1701.84.
97. Pub. L. No. 88-467, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 20, 1964).
98. The time for filing such registration statement has been extended to April 30, 1965, for
many corporations which would have had to file earlier and the applicability of the proxy re-
quirements has been slightly deferred as to some companies: Rule 12 (g)-i under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.
99. See note 97 supra.
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tion of a Form S-14 registration statement is simply an expanded Regula-
tion 14 proxy statement.
A Regulation 14 proxy statement for a Rule 133 transaction, and
hence a Form S-14 registration statement, must, in common with all proxy
statements under Regulation 14, include information concerning the
revocability of a proxy, a description of dissenters' rights upon approval,
if any, identification of those on whose behalf the proxy solicitation is
being made, the interest of insiders in the transactions to be voted upon,
and certain information with respect to the number of shares outstanding
and the identity and holdings of shareholders of record or shareholders
known to own beneficially more than ten per cent of the outstanding
voting securities of the issuer.
Item 14 of Schedule 14A sets forth with particularity the information
to be disclosed with respect to mergers, consolidations, acquisitions, and
similar matters. Generally, this Item requires information concerning
the business of the other parties to the transaction, the location and gen-
eral character of their plants, dividend arrearages and defaults on securi-
ties, and the market prices of the parties' securities. In addition, specified
financial statements must be furnished for both the company issuing the
proxy statement and the other companies party to the transaction.
Form S-14 requires that in addition to the foregoing there must also
be included in the prospectus the information concerning the officers and
directors specified in Item 7 of Schedule 14 (information not ordinarily
required in a proxy statement pertaining to transactions specified in Item
14 of Schedule 14A) such as their compensation, the rights of officers,
directors, and principal shareholders under pension and profit sharing
plans, their rights under any option arrangements, their indebtedness to
the company, and any interest they may have had during the preceding
year in material transactions with the company or which they may have
in any proposed material transaction. There must also be included identi-
fication of those on whose behalf the securities are being offered and in-
formation about the underwriting and distribution arrangements. In ad-
dition, the prospectus must comply with certain other formal require-
ments applicable to all prospectuses forming parts of registration state-
ments.
Part II of the registration statement, as distinguished from the pro-
spectus or Part I (the portion distributed to the public) must contain
certain information set forth in Form S-14 and there must be filed
specified exhibits. The statement must be signed by certain officers and
a majority of the board of directors of the registrant. It should also be
noted that Part II, while not required to be furnished to offerees or buy-
ers, is available for public inspection at the office of the Commission and
copies may be secured.
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"Undertakings" requirements.-The most unique aspects of Form
S-14 are the "undertakings" requirements. Prior to the 1964 amend-
ments, section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 required
each issuer that registered securities under the Securities Act of 1933 to
undertake to file with the Commission certain periodic reports correspond-
ing to those required to be filed by corporations listed on securities ex-
changes. To this extent the undertaking procedure had foundation in
law. However, the Commission, in the course of developing its enforce-
ment procedures, has administratively required the inclusion of various
other undertakings which may not enjoy comparable or any legal sanc-
tion.:Lt
Among these latter undertakings are those required to be included
in a Form S-14 registration statement. As a part of a Form S-14 registra-
tion statement, the registrant must undertake, for the purpose of public
offering and sale in the United States of the registered securities, that:
(1) it will file a post-effective amendment or amendments so that, for a
period of 24 months after the effective date of the registration statement,
there will be available a current prospectus,'' and (2) at the request of
any security holder who is an underwriter under paragraphs (b) or (c)
of Rule 133 and who proposes to make a public offering of any of the
registered securities (other than on a national securities exchange or in
transactions properly within the scope of paragraphs (d) and (e) of
Rule 133) the registrant will file a post-effective amendment or amend-
ments to the statement setting forth information regarding the offering
security holders and the underwriting and distribution arrangements.
In addition, the form of undertaking contains an agreement by the
registrant that for the purpose of determining liability under the Securi-
ties Act of 1933, the effective date of each amendment shall be deemed
the effective date of the registration statement with respect to securities
sold after the amendment becomes effective." 2 The purpose of this
100. Throop, Recent Developments with Respect to Rule 133, 15 Bus. LAw. 119, 127
(1959).
101. A "current" prospectus is one which does not contain information, induding certified
financial statements, older than 16 months, does not contain a materially false statement, and
does not omit a material fact or one necessary to make the other statements in the prospectus
not misleading. Section 10(a) (3), 68 Star. 685 (1954), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1958).
102. Section 8(c) provides that amendments filed after the effective date of the registration
statement become effective "on such date as the Commission may determine, having due re-
gard for the public interest and the protection of investors." Generally post-effective amend-
ments become effective some time after their filing on the date determined by the Commission.
However, it has been suggested that a post-effective amendment may have a broader scope
and effect than generally realized: "A post-effective amendment which purports to make only
minor changes may, nevertheless, have the effect of reaffirming other facts which were true
when the registration statement originally became effective, but which have since become un-
true. Accordingly, most lawyers have been reluctant to file post-effective amendments except
where absolutely necessary." THOMAS, FEDERAL SEcuRrmas ACT HANDBOOK 90 (1959).
The undertaking required in a Form S-14 registration statement makes the effective date
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agreement is to avoid the running of the relatively short statute of limi-
tations applicable to section 11 violations0 3 and to preserve thereby the
broad remedial rights of purchasers of registered securities.
The upshot of the undertakings is that the registrant must maintain
the currency of the prospectus forming part of the registration statement
for a period of two years following its effectiveness. If an offering is
being made at the end of the two year period there is probably an obli-
gation to continue keeping the prospectus and statement current until
that offering is completed." 4 There is an implication in all of this, of
course, that securities not offered by Rule 133 underwriters at the end of
two years may be thereafter offered freely without registration or use of a
prospectus."0 5 However, this implication to date has no official Com-
mission confirmation. °6
Other forms.-If an issuer is not eligible to use Form S-14, in that
it is not subject to the Commission's proxy rules or did not solicit proxies
in connection with the Rule 133 transaction, the securities which should
be registered because of paragraphs (b) and (c) of Rule 133 must be
registered on another appropriate Form.0 7 This will usually be Form
S-1. While no official Commission pronouncement has so indicated, the
registration statement must include undertakings comparable to those
required in a Form S-14 registration regardless of the Form used.'
It has been suggested that any issuer which complies with the Com-
mission's proxy rules and uses a proxy statement complying with Schedule
of the entire registration statement as to securities sold thereafter the date upon which the
post-effective amendment becomes effective. Obviously in such circumstances great care must
be taken to insure that the entire contents of the registration statement are accurate and com-
plete at the date the post-effective amendment becomes effective.
103. Section 13 of the Securities Act provides that no action may be brought to enforce
liability under § 11 (which defines liabilities arising out of registration statements) "unless
brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or omission, or after
such discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence [and] in no
event shall any such action be brought.., more than three years after the security was bona
fide offered to the public .. "
104. PRACTICING LAW INSTruTE, op. cit. supra note 53, at 213.
105. Of course, if the "underwriter" is also a controlling person of the issuer he is under
the same restrictions as any other controlling person in making an offering involving an
underwriter.
Generally, only distributions involving issuers and controlling persons are subject to the
xegistration and prospectus requirements of 5 5 of the Securities Act, and distributions in-
-volving controlling persons are so subject only in the event that an "underwriter" as defined
in § 2(11) is involved. Obviously in many situations one or more persons receiving stock
in a Rule 133 transaction may upon completion of the transaction have become a controlling
person of the issuer. See CAVTrcH, OHIO CORpORATION LAw 5 20.2 (1964), with respect
to distributions by a controlling person and the ascertainment of who are controlling persons.
106. Charles E. Shreve, who was at the time Chief Counsel of the Division of Corporation
Finance of the Securities and Exchange Commission, in 1962 expressed doubt that the secur-
ities became free of registration and prospectus requirements at the end of two years. PRAc-
TILING LAW INsTrrTTE, op. cit. supra note 53, at 214.
107. Id. at 213.
108. Id. at 214.
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14A, even though not technically required to so comply, should be
permitted to use Form S-14.1"9 Presumably in some measure the ra-
tionale of the Commission's confinement of Form S-14 principally to
listed issuers is based on the fact that considerable information with
respect to such issuers is generally available as a consequence of required
filings with the exchanges and Commission. The suggested extension of
Form S-14, while perhaps less urgent in the light of the recent amend-
ments to the federal securities laws, nevertheless may still be worthy of
consideration.
As previously noted, Form S-14 implies that at the end of two years
from the effectiveness of the registration statement securities issued in a
Rule 133 transaction still in the hands of paragraph (b) and (c) under-
writers are free of the necessity of continued registration and use of the
statutory prospectus. It has been suggested that the same result would
be true with respect to securities registered on other forms used because
of the unavailability of Form S-14."'
SAFEGUARDING RULE 133 TRANSACTIONS
The provisions of Rule 133 and the requirements of Form S-14 dic-
tate safeguards to be followed in the negotiation and preparation of
agreements for Rule 133 transactions."' Two considerations define the
cautions to be followed. 2 Those who receive securities in a Rule 133
transaction desire to have freely marketable securities, but lacking that,
they wish to be certain that in the event they desire to sell the securities
received they will have such cooperation as they need from the issuer.
On the other hand, the issuer is interested in avoiding any possible
violation of the Securities Act as the consequence not only of its own
conduct, but also of the conduct of recipients of its securities in a Rule
133 transaction.
In order to avoid a violation, the issuer must first determine the
identity of the persons in control of the corporation whose assets are be-
ing acquired or which is being merged because the securities received by
such persons will not be freely transferable. While it has been urged that
the test of "controlling person" or "controlling group" should be the
109. Throop, supra note 100, at 119, 126.
110. PRACricING LAw INsTUTE, op. cit. supra note 53, at 213.
111. See Throop, supra note 100, at 128, for an excellent discussion of the safeguards which
should be worked into the agreements pertaining to a Rule 133 transaction.
112. It should be borne in mind that often the exact form of the agreements with respect to
the securities issued in a Rule 133 transaction will be a result of negotiations and the give-
and-take of bargaining. Consequently, many agreements will not include provision for all
of the described contingencies and will not contain agreements with respect to all of the matters
discussed.
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person or persons able to compel the Rule 133 transaction113 (in ef-
fect a sort of "negotiated transaction" standard), the Commission in
promulgating the amendments to Rule 133 dearly adopted the cus-
tomary meaning of the term." 4  Although determination of control may
be a subtle and involved problem, it is imperative that the issuer seek its
solution. This may involve a careful scrutiny of the history of the corpo-
ration, examination of its record books, interviews with officers and di-
rectors, and any other procedures which may elicit the necessary informa-
tion upon which an informed judgment should rest.
Once having determined the identity of the controlling persons, the
issuer should secure agreement of such persons, or the agreement of the
other party to the transaction that it will deliver such agreements as a
condition of closing, to the effect that: (1) they take the securities for
investment and not for the purpose of resale or distribution; (2) they
consent to the placement of a legend on the certificates evidencing their
securities stating that they have taken the securities for investment and
not for resale or distribution, that such securities have been issued in re-
liance upon such representation, and that no transfer of the securities will
be made unless either there has been secured the opinion of counsel for
the corporation that registration is not required, or the securities have
been registered;".. and (3) they consent to the placement of a "stop
order" on the transfer books of the issuer as a means of enforcing the
restrictions on transfer."' In addition, the issuer would be wise to pro-
cure an agreement for indemnification against any liabilities it might be
subjected to as a result of a violation of the agreement (the Commission
might regard such an indemnification as contrary to public policy). If
those who might be considered in control of the disappearing or selling
corporation hesitate to sign investment representations, such indemnifi-
cation would be imperative.
The above agreement would have the effect of "locking in" the erst-
113. Committee Report, supra note 73, at 429-30.
114. Throop, supra note 100, at 125.
115. OHIO REV. CODE § 1701.25(B), provides that no restriction on the right to transfer
shares shall be effective against the transferee of such shares unless the terms of the restriction
or notice thereof are set forth on the face or the back of the certificate. A suggested form of
restriction to be placed on the face or back of the certificate evidencing the securities is as
follows:
These securities have been issued in connection with a transaction described in
Rule 133 under the Securities Act of 1933 and have not been registered under
said Act in reliance upon the representation of the recipient that they are received
for investment and not with a view to distribution. They may not be offered or
sold, and no transfer of them will be made by the Company or its transfer agent,
unless (1) they are registered under the Securities Act of 1933, or (2) there is
presented to the Company an opinion of counsel satisfactory to the Company to the
effect that such registration is not necessary.
116. See Israels, Some Commercial Overtones of Private Placement, 45 VA. L. REV. 851,
861 (1959), for a lengthy discussion of restrictions on transfer.
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while underwriter for at least two years and would, for all practical pur-
poses, make future disposition of the received securities dependent upon
the cooperation of the issuer. Thus, unless the controlling persons of the
predecessor or selling corporation are willing to be so confined, or be-
lieve they can make any dispositions they may wish within the provisions
of paragraphs (d) and (e) of Rule 133,"1 they should secure an agree-
ment from the issuer to register the securities immediately or upon re-
quest."' Request for such an agreement will invariably be accompanied
by the urgent suggestion of the issuer that the expenses of a registration
be borne by the security holders. In this connection the issuer would
also be wise to exact some agreement as to the frequency with which the
"underwriter" may request the filing of post-effective amendments.
In the light of the provisions of Form S-14 the "underwriters" will
probably want the issuer to agree to comply with the Form S-14 under-
takings, including filing post-effective amendments and the furnishing of
up-dated prospectuses. Likewise, the issuer will want the "underwriters"
to agree to furnish the necessary information concerning themselves and
the underwriting and distribution. Also, the parties will probably want
cross-indemnifications under which the "underwriters" indemnify the
issuer against liabilities arising out of information they supply and the
issuer indemnifies the "underwriters" against liabilities arising out of the
other information in the statement. The issuer will wisely limit its obli-
gation to file amendments to the period of two years after the effective-
ness of the statement unless an offering is then being made. Likewise
the issuer will insist that the "underwriters" inform it when the offering
of the securities is completed in the United States so that it may then file
a final post-effective amendment de-registering the remaining shares,
while the underwriters will want an agreement that at the end of two
years or the end of the offering in the United States such a final amend-
ment will be filed. Without this latter agreement the securities will re-
main registered indefinitely with a continuing obligation on the under-
writers, even after two years, to comply with the prospectus requirements
of section 5.1
117. See p. 31 supra.
118. It is probably wise, if there is to be a registration, to have it sooner than later since the
two year period for keeping the prospectus current starts from effectiveness of the registration
statement.
119. Section 5(b) (1) makes it unlawful to transmit by the mails or other means of inter-
state commerce any "prospectus" pertaining to a security other than a prospectus provided
for under § 10 of the Securities Act if a registration statement has been filed with respect to
such security. Section 5 (b) (2) makes it unlawful to carry such a security by the mails or
other means of interstate commerce unless accompanied or preceded by a § 10(a) prospectus.
These requirements become operative upon the filing of the registration statement and pre-
sumably continue in effect until such time as the distribution of the securities is completed
or they have been de-registered, or, as to dealers, the 40 or 90 day period for use of the
prospectus expires.
19641
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
While the foregoing discussion is only in terms of Form S-14, ob-
viously the same considerations have application if that Form is not
available.
"No SALE" IN OTHER CONTEXTS
Rule 133 explicitly states that "For purposes only of section 5 of
the Act. ..""' submissions of proposals for mergers and other described
transactions do not constitute "offers to sell" or "sales." Inasmuch as
the Commission has seen fit to remove these transactions from the defini-
tion of "sale" for purposes of this one section, should they also be ex-
cluded from the other sections of the Securities Act, specifically, section
12(2) which imposes civil liability on anyone who offers or sells a
security by the mails or other interstate means through material misstate-
ments or omissions, and section 17(a) which makes it unlawful to use
fraudulent means or material misstatements or omissions in the offer or
sale of a security through the mails or other interstate means?
The Commission, although intimating in its brief in National Supply
Co. v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ.21 that perhaps the exclusion ex-
tended to other sections of the Securities Act as well, has otherwise con-
sistently contended that the exclusion is confined to section 5. This posi-
tion has been for the most part confirmed by the courts,122 although in at
least one case a federal court held that solicitation of proxies for a merger
was not for the purpose of effecting a purchase or sale of any security. 2
As noted previously, the Securities Act in and of itself virtually com-
pels the conclusion that within a single statute the same word can have
different meanings, and the courts have had no difficulty in so determin-
ing.12
4
After an initial flirtation with the extension of the no-sale theory to
other statutes which it enforces,'25 the Commission has retreated and now
apparently takes the position that "sale" and related terms, in the con-
text of other acts, includes mergers, consolidations, sales of assets and
the like. 2 1
CONCLUSION
The controversy which raged over Rule 133, particularly from 1956
through 1959, has abated. The quiet is perhaps recognition that the
120. Rule 133.
121. 134 F.2d 689 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 773 (1943).
122. SEC v. Anaconda Lead and Silver Co., Litig. Rel. 2059 (D. Colo. 1961).
123. Sawyer v. Pioneer Mill Co., 190 F. Supp. 21 (D. Hawaii 1960), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
814 (1962).
124. See p. 29 supra.
125. Phoenix Securities Corp., 9 S.E.C. 241 (1941).
126. E. L duPont, SEC Inv. Co. Act. Rel. No. 1837 (Jan. 26, 1953), 34 S.E.C. 531 (1953).
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revised Rule is serving its purpose and thwarting the abuses which nearly
caused its complete demise. However, it is possible that the controversy
may be revived by new and now unforeseen abuses, or by a judicial deter-
mination that the Rule is an improper exercise of the Commission's
authority. In that event, it is likely that efforts would be made to secure
enactment of legislation approximating the Rule. From all indications,
however, there is little likelihood that the courts will be inclined to
overturn the Rule. This is especially true since the Commission says the
Rule is limited to sections 4 and 5 of the Securities Act.
Defendants charged with offenses under sections 12(2) and 17(a)
of the Securities Act and under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 occurring during mergers and other Rule 133 transactions
will undoubtedly assert that a "sale is a sale is a sale" and that a transac-
tion not a "sale" under section 5 is never a "sale" under the Securities Act.
The likelihood of success of this contention is limited since courts are
likely to continue finding that mergers, consolidations, and the like do
entail "sales" when the problem is one of applying those provisions.
Peaceful acceptance is now the apparent lot of Rule 133. May it
thrive in peace.
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